

EU proposals on CCPs' recovery and resolutions in light of the international debate*

1.- By now, we all know much, if not all, about legislative initiatives and supervisory guidance on CCPs recovery and resolution. We know that, as Steven Maijoor nicely put it¹, the management of CCPs risk of default is all about three aspects which are strictly interlinked: “resilience, recovery and resolution”. Resilience is based on requirements that impose: a) pre-funded resources to cover default losses under extreme but plausible market conditions, including at least the default of the 2 biggest clearing members; b) capital requirements to protect against the risks of non-default losses (operational, legal and business risks) and to provide “skin-in-the-game” for CCPs' operators; c) concentration limits on transactions, to contain investment and custody losses and on clearing members' counterparts, to contain the illiquidity risks. Yet, and on top of that, as Benoit Coeuré also recently noted², resilience of CCPs is *per se* particularly strong: CCPs manage the risk of a matched book and, unlike deposit funded banks, rely on the financial strength of their members to provide margins and, if they prove insufficient, on their collective awareness that they will be called to share additional losses (through cash calls, haircuts of variation margins, forced allocation of positions and contracts, full or partial tear up and other tools)³. Benoit Coeuré captures very well this point noting that “bail-in is integral to CCPs' operational set up” and, in turn, that since banks are the most important clearing members, banks' supervision, recovery and resolution help ensuring that clearing members meet all clearing obligations and therefore do not pose a threat to CCP continuity.

2.- Recovery comes when CCPs must address uncovered default losses beyond the pre-funded resources or uncovered non default losses. This should be, in principle, a quite unlikely event, if plans meant to ensure resilience and ongoing supervision have been duly engineered and implemented. Resolution should occur as a tail event, a “black swan”. Yet, an extremely catastrophic one. And this justifies the ammunition of resolution instruments that are currently devised to ensure an orderly default procedure for CCPs without disruption of critical services to preserve financial stability. As again Steven Maijoor noted, “recovery and resolution arrangements

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¹ ‘Resilience, Recovery and Resolution: Three essential Rs for CCPs’, ILF Conference “Resolution in Europe: The Unresolved Questions”, 23 April 2018, Goethe University, Frankfurt am Main

² ‘A cooperative approach to CCP recovery and resolution’, ILF Conference “Resolution in Europe: The Unresolved Questions”, 23 April 2018, Goethe University, Frankfurt am Main

³ On the specific recovery tools, see CPMI IOSCO, ‘Recovery of financial markets infrastructures’ revision July 2017, p. 4.

should maintain incentives to ensure reliance in the business as usual situation”. Moreover, recovery has a micro-perspective (the objective to maintain CCP’s viability as a going concern: note, however, that this cannot be at the price of jeopardizing financial stability; if there is a conflict, macroprudential needs would prevail over the microprudential ones and “the competent authority may require the CCP to refrain from taking the recovery measure: see Article 9(4) EC Proposal for a Regulation on CCP recovery and resolution), whereas resolution has a macro-perspective (the objective is to pursue financial stability by preserving the continuity of critical services, possibly also by a successor entity, if the CCP is wound down). This has important implications: what we qualify as an essential critical service is likely to be different in a recovery perspective (which is meant to preserve all services vital to the ongoing viability of the entity) and in a resolution perspective (which is meant to focus only on services vital to financial stability). Thus, strategies, planning, tools may also be different.

4.- Having all this in mind, I would like to focus on the international and institutional dimensions of the current EU proposals for recovery and resolution and then briefly conclude with a question of European institutional design that, to my simple mind, remains unanswered in the current EMIR 2.2. framework. If we look at CCPs recovery and resolution from an international perspective, it is clear that Europe is a late comer. The CFTC was the first CCP supervisor to finalize a rule in 2013 – and thus some 5 years ago, by now - establishing recovery and resolution planning requirements. Subsequent CFTC guidance, adopted in 2017, raised further, as it has been noted⁴, the bar on the depth and breadth of detail and analysis expected for CCPs. And this occurred when banks and insurance companies received, in the US, some relief with respect to their resolution plans. In turn, international standards for recovery of financial market infrastructures were first developed in 2014 by the BIS Committee on Payments and Market Infrastructures and IOSCO and then refined and revised in July 2017. More recently CPMI-IOSCO issued, in April 2018, a framework for supervisory stress testing of CCPs. FSB, in turn, adopted in 2014 its Key Attributes, in July 2017 issued its guidance on CCPs Resolution and Resolution Planning and last 21 June 2018 its very interesting “Funding Strategy Elements fo an Implementable Resolution Plan”. The reason why an international approach, and not just a national or regional one, is necessary is crystal clear: many CCPs are globally systemic, they clear derivatives in global markets and their members and clients’ members are from across the world. It is very difficult to identify a financial player (in this case a financial infrastructure) less parochial and more interconnected than CCPs, although it is true that among the 26 across 15 jurisdictions in Noth

⁴ D. Ryan, ‘Recovery and Resolution: Uneven Bars for CCps and Banks’, in Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation, August 27, 2016

America, south America, Europe, and Asia-Pacific assessed in their interdependence by FSB and IOSCO in July 2017⁵ some are more peripheral and less systemically relevant (but also the less interconnected present at least one node of interconnection with the globally systemically).. This calls for detailed international standards and their loyal implementation through strong international cooperation among all competent authorities responsible for all major cross-border CCPs. However, whilst we have the standards, we do not have any joint resolution planning among competent authorities and, as again Benoit Coeuré rightly noted, despite the requirement to this effect in the FSB Key Attributes, “no cross border crisis management arrangements are yet in place”. This means that, globally, we are quite advanced in the development of our law in the books (our ‘coding’) for CCPs recovery and resolution (including rules on the establishment of Crisis Management Groups and CCP-specific cooperative agreements: see FSB Key Attributes 7 and 8 and p. 9 of FSB Guidance) but we are still quite unprepared as to the law in action, at least at the level of the external dimension of the cooperation among competent authorities as to cross border, joint recovery and resolution planning. Sad, but to some extent understandable, if only we consider that the centrality of CCPs is a product of post crisis regulation and CCP supervision is still at its infancy. The good news is however that, at the global level, the direction of travel is clear, and progress is measurable. With a comment, which is obvious: the less in number and the bigger in size and expertise the CCPs competent authorities, the easier to implement their international strict cooperation.

5.- Unfortunately, Europe is particularly problematic in this. Europe, despite its best efforts with recent legislative initiatives, seems still quite unable to deliver an optimal regional dimension of supervision on EU CCPs. In Europe we still supervise EU CCPs at the local level, adopting different supervisory schemes (in the UK and Italy CCPs are not licensed as banks, as they are in France and Germany) and we still pay credit to a clear misconception of the possible effects of their resolution: that this would entail national fiscal responsibility of the Member State of establishment. This is however a misguided policy. On one hand, it is self-evident that, as again Benoit Coeuré noted, “given that cross-border membership of EU banks in EU CCPs is widespread”, interdependence and spill over effects would be such that a failure of a major EU CCP would generate EU-wide fiscal risks, and namely fiscal risks in each Member State where CCP participants are located. On the other hand, even assuming that a CCP’s home country may be called into action as a temporary public sector backstop funding mechanism (as envisaged e.g. from the FSB Funding Strategy Elements of an Implementable Resolution Plan and in turn by Article 45-

⁵ FSB, OICV-IOSCO, ‘Analysis of Central Clearing Interdependencies’, 5 July 2017 (data as of 30.9.2016).

47 of the EC proposal for a Regulation on CCPs' recovery and resolution) "to provide temporary public funding during resolution, such support would be then recouped from clearing members, in line with their obligations to contribute to comprehensive loss absorption". One may argue that under EMIR EU CCPs are supervised by the home country supervisor with the assistance of colleges. The problem lies however with the functioning of such colleges. A reality check shows that these colleges can include as many as 20 member authorities, that, despite college assistance, the decision making powers is firmly in the hands of the home country competent authority, that there are significant differences in supervisory practises (also on model validation processes), and that the role of central banks is not adequately reflected in the colleges. One must be a quite optimistic person indeed to trust that the same sub-optimal, fully decentralised institutional design, originally engineered for EU CCPs supervision⁶ and now transplanted by the current proposal on CCPs recovery and resolution in the resolution context (Article 4 of the EC proposal for a Regulation on CCPs' recovery and resolution; note that, pursuant to Article 4(3) ESMA has no voting rights in the college)– colleges of resolution authorities assisting the home resolution authority – is up to the task.

6.- At the same time, it seems to me that this institutional design for EU CCPs' supervision and resolution sits in sharp contrast with the envisaged policy to be adopted vis-à-vis third countries CCPs: a policy, this latter, clearly engineered as a response to Brexit (and with an hawkish flavour in it, if one consider the exposed 'nuclear weapon' of CCP re-location for Tier2 CCPs posing a risk to the Union's financial stability). Out of any obsession for regulatory symmetry, the two-tiered approach in TC CCPs supervision, in my view, tells a lesson also for EU CCPs supervision: ESMA must be the key supervisor for all systemically relevant Tier 2 CCPs, EU and TC alike (for TC CCPs, it is going to be such even stretching its powers to an unprecedented, for Europe, extraterritorial dimension, based upon appropriate MoU with the home country supervisor: something that mirrors what US competent authorities already do); reliance on national competent authorities and colleges, provided that they are duly geared by ESMA, may be enough for Tier 1 CCPs (and a nice example of applied proportionality: proportionality is a key principle rightly enshrined also in the EU proposal for a Regulation on CCPs' recovery and resolution under Article 7). Only in this way ESMA will be able to develop a credible internal supervisory unit for CCPs (how can we expect ESMA to do so, if it is called only to directly supervise Tier 2 third countries

⁶ For a discussion of existing supervisory arrangements on CCPs and their proposed reform, compare at least D.Busch, 'A stronger role for the European supervisory authorities in the EU 27', in Busch, Ferrarini, Avgouleas (eds), *Capital Markets Union in Europe*, OUP, 2018, p. 28; M. Lamandini, D. Ramos Munoz, *Supervisory Systems after Brexit: coordination between EU and UK on a daily basis*, EBI working paper 2018, forthcoming; R. Bismuth, 'The Federalisation of Financial Supervision in the US and the EU: A Historical-Comparative Perspective', in ANdenas, Deipenbrock (eds.), *Regulating and SUPervising European Financial Markets*, Springer, 2016, p. 231 ff.

CCPs?) and will credibly act as the single European entry point for international cooperation in cross border recovery and resolution planning for all globally systemic CCPs. (and I see that also Steven Maijoor is rightly arguing that “it is important to have the right balance between EU-CCP supervision and TC-CCP supervision because only in that way we can achieve the envisaged benefits in terms of scale and expertise and ensure credibility of EU supervise of TC-CCPs”) To this effect, the envisaged reform of its governance with the ESAs reform, and the ensuing accommodation of the original proposal for a CCP Executive Session to the new ESAs governance (centred on the CCPs Supervisory Committee and its full-time, professional and independent Chair), as nicely suggested by the Danuta Hübner EP report first and by the Council compromise (Article 25bb) text two weeks ago (Presidency Compromise Proposal, 10499/18, 26 June 2018), seems at point. At the same time it is worth noting that ESMA, being the sole EU financial supervisory agency with direct supervisory experience beyond the SSM, is going to be granted, through CCPs direct supervision, a pivotal role in the preservation of financial stability and this will imply also that new micro and macro prudential remits will be conferred upon an agency which so far had little financial stability standing compared to the other financial supervisory agencies. As I said I have no obsessions with regulatory symmetry and I believe that this may turn into an unexpected opportunity to leverage skills and role for ESMA. But this also explains why the legislative proposals rightly insist on the complementary role which has to be given to the central banks of issue (for which preservation of financial stability is a complementary mandate along the price stability mandate: see e.g. for the ECB Article 127(1) and 127(5) TFEU).

7.- This takes me to the conclusion and to a simple question. If we can agree that a rational design of institutional engineering would be conducive to a key role for ESMA for all Tier 2 (systemically relevant) CCPs and for a complementary role of the ECB as central bank of issue for all euro-denominated trades (also based upon the envisaged reform of Article 22 of its Statute), shouldn't we also ask if time has come to require for all EU CCPs a special banking license and to take, in this way, also the SRB into the picture? So far, out of the 16 EU based CCPs, 10 are located in the Euro area. 3 – and among them LCH – are based in the United Kingdom and are therefore bound to become third country CCPs. Of the remaining three, one is Swedish, and is the European leg of Nasdaq OMX clearing (and will thus call for a strong international cooperation between US and EU). The latter two are Tier 1 CCPs based in Poland and Hungary. Among the 10 CCPs located within the Euro area, some are licensed as banks and already fall, therefore, within the scope of the BRRD and SRMR. Wouldn't it be right to take the 10 Euro system CCPs under the umbrella of the SRB as resolution authority and to extend to them the use as last resort temporary

public sector funding mechanism of the SRF and its forthcoming final fiscal backstop, the European Monetary Fund?